The Significance Attributed in Europe to Ethnic Origin

A memorandum for the Ethnic Relations in Europe Workshop at the British Sociological Association annual conference in Leeds, 11-13 April 2012

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Social policies

An analysis of data on the socio-economic integration of immigrants in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom has come to an important conclusion about policies for promoting multiculturalism. It counts as multicultural those state policies that grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts. The study concludes that, when combined with a generous welfare state, these policies have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of residential segregation, and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour. The author argues that Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, which have combined multicultural policies with a strong welfare state, display relatively poor integration outcomes. Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France, which either had more restrictive or assimilationist integration policies, and the United Kingdom, which was considered to have a relatively lean welfare state, achieved better integration results. (Koopmans 2010: 1)

This analysis relies on Esping-Andersen's distinction between three types of welfare state, according to the degree of their `decommodification', something that occurs `when service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market'. Social democratic welfare states have the highest, liberal welfare states the lowest, and conservative welfare states intermediary levels of decommodification. Koopmans (2010: 7-8) adds `Sweden belongs to the social democratic type, the UK (along with, for instance, the USA, Canada and Australia) to the liberal type, and France, Germany and Switzerland to the conservative type. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands straddle the conservative type and the social-democratic type, depending on which aspect of decommodification one considers'.

Seen from this perspective, the welfare state assumes responsibility for seeing that everyone's basic needs are met. Goods and services to meet these needs are furnished as rights, not things to be bought as commodities. Though the intention is to promote integration, the outcome is the opposite.

Another recent study (Hansen, 2011) reports that the unemployment rate of male foreign-born workers relative to native-born workers in Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands and Sweden is higher than that in Germany and the UK, and

much higher than that in Canada and the USA. As Hansen's data show, `the US integrates migrants into work, Europe integrates them into welfare'. There are also contrasts in public opinion. `Germans hold an unreciprocated set of negative attitudes towards their Muslim co-citizens' … `The British are tied with the French for the most positive attitudes towards Muslims and the most optimistic view of the prospects for Muslim integration. If so, British Muslims do not show much gratitude'… `French Muslims are the most positively predisposed towards their countrymen. They are also the most self-critical' … `Large-scale immigration policies work when migrants are channelled into work and kept out of welfare'.

A sociological perspective?

States like the US and Canada were built by immigration and by treaties with the indigenous peoples. In the USA the indigenous peoples were accounted domestic dependent nations. In Canada they have become the first nations. In New Zealand the treaty of Waitangi regulates relations between the Maori and the white settler population known as Pakeha. Only in Australia were there no treaties. Aboriginal people did not become citizens of their own country, and were not counted in the census, until 1968.

European states are quite different. Theirs have traditionally been societies of emigration. Some still are. When mass immigration from outside Europe into western states started after World War II there was no question of treaties. The immigrants had to find places in existing structures. In each European state there are citizens who see themselves as the *staatsvolk*. By comparison with other regions, they also have strong welfare states. The *staatsvolk* sees itself as the creator and owner of its welfare state, built from the contributions it has made over the years. This sentiment influences its perception of immigrants.

Instead of utilising an American conception of `ethnicity', sociologists of Europe should make use of the expression `ethnic origin'. This entered international law in 1965 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Under Article 5 of that convention, states parties undertake to prohibit discrimination `as to… national or ethnic origin'. No previous use of this expression has come to light. In 1990, in its General Recommendation VIII, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated that, after having considered reports from states parties, it was `of the opinion that such identification shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned'. This has not been challenged.

My contention is that sociologists can best develop a distinctive perspective onto the socio-economic integration of immigrants into European societies by using a `bottom-up' approach designed to discover the social significance attributed to the ethnic origin, or origins, of individuals. It has to begin with a re-examination of the use of the word `ethnicity'.

The three `ethnicities'

The expression `ethnic origin' is of sociological as well as legal importance because there has been much imprecision in the use of the word `ethnicity'; that word was first employed in 1953 to denote a feeling of threat observable in a particular kind of group.

The expression `ethnic group' was first appeared in a critique of Nazi racial theory. Huxley and Haddon (1935: 138) proposed that the big categories of people in Europe (like, say, Slavs) be referred to as `ethnic groups' rather than as `races'. In the 1950 UNESCO statement on race, `ethnic group' was again preferred as a replacement for `race'.

In the nineteen-forties the expression `ethnic group' came into use in American sociology in quite a different sense. It was used to differentiate Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans from White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Americans.

Whereas many anthropologists thereafter used `ethnic group' as a replacement for `race', sociologists used it in the popular US sense. Because of the confusion, the notion of an `ethnic boundary' proposed by Fredrik Barth (1969) was welcomed as clarifying the vocabulary. It caught on as an alternative superior to the assumption that an ethnic group was a social fact, a thing-in-itself, and that therefore the social scientist did not have to explain its existence. Note that Barth used the adjective *ethnic*. He did not employ the noun *ethnicity*.

The noun was more used in sociology after publication of the volume *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience*, edited by Glazer and Moynihan (1975). In preparation for a conference, the editors had `asked several individuals to prepare short papers that might serve as a basis of discussion'. Later, they solicited further contributions. Their intention was to assemble theoretical and empirical studies of `situations in which ethnic groups distinguish themselves'. The chief thrust, however, appears to have been the editors' concern with the *emic* construct of `ethnicity' as an *explanandum*. They wrote: `We are suggesting that a new word reflects a new reality and a new usage reflects a change in that reality. The new word is "ethnicity"' (1975: 5). Many of the contributors provided analyses of particular situations that could be explicated by reference only to ethnic groups and ethnic boundaries, and at least one concluded that the `term `ethnicity' is clearly a confusing one' (1975: 156). Nevertheless, the editors' postulated that `ethnicity' was `a new reality'; they used the word as the title for the book; their encouragement of the view that the appearance on the political stage of `ethnicity' was to be explained as the product of either primordialism or circumstantialism caught the attention of students of these matters. The editors' decision guided the course of teaching and research for a quarter-century.

In my *Racial and Ethnic Competition* I included a passage under the caption `the two ethnicities', in which I distinguished majority ethnicity from minority ethnicity (Banton 1983a: 165). Majority ethnicity characterized nations, or, following Huxley and Haddon, large groups like the Slavs. Minority ethnicity, I wrote, `is dependent, firstly, on the desire of minority members to utilize their common ethnic

characteristics, and, secondly, on the readiness of the majority society to regard ethnicity as a legitimate basis for the formation of minority groups'.

If I was to use `ethnicity' as a noun, I should have written instead of three ethnicities; firstly, the Huxley and Haddon conception of a large category of persons distinguished by both physical and cultural characteristics; secondly, majority ethnicity as the sense of identity shared by the *staatsvolk*, the dominant component of a state; and thirdly, minority ethnicity as the sense of identity shared among other persons distinguished by either physical or cultural characteristics. Majority ethnicity includes a claim to precedence; minority ethnicity accepts minority status.

However, I now prefer to avoid use of the expression `ethnicity' whenever possible, and to maintain instead that ethnic origin distinguishes one of the many dimensions to social relations between individuals. Two persons, A and B, may interact as man and woman, or as persons of the same gender. They can also interact as persons of the same, or different, social status, ethnic origin, citizenship, religious faith, and so on. The number of possible dimensions to their relations is great indeed. A gender relationship is differentiated from a social status relationship or an ethnic relationship by the parties' awareness of norms that define the nature of the relationship in question. The significance attached to a particular dimension varies from one society to another, and, within a particular society, according to circumstances. In the same way, the ethnic dimension for the Roma in most European countries has a different significance than that for most other minorities. Their status is very different. Roma `ethnicity' is closer to the Huxley and Haddon conception of an ethnic group.

The expression `ethnic origin' has a further advantage that also bears upon a difference in associations with expressions like `ethnic group' and `ethnic minority'. In North American and West European usage an ethnic identification does not have the near-permanence of what is considered a racial identification. Individuals have a choice about how strongly they wish to be identified ethnically. In Eastern Europe, where state boundaries have been redrawn (as after World War I) some people have found themselves citizens of a different state; they may have been accounted national minorities. Thus Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

> In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

This use of the word `minority' is sometimes associated with a conception of a permanent identity. Ethnic origin is more fluid, an identification which individuals can often manipulate to suit their purposes.

There are limits to this. Persons in Britain of an appearance suggesting that they have Asian and African origins report that members of the ethnic majority sometimes ask them `Where are you from?' and are dissatisfied if the other person says that he or she was born in Leeds. Presumably this is because members of an ethnic majority associate a sign of distinctive ethnic origin with

social attributes connected with overseas countries, just as almost everyone has different expectations of persons categorised by gender.

Nomenclature

As already suggested, majority perceptions of minorities, and the names they use to identify them, are influenced by the people's conceptions of themselves and of the country they inhabit. In line with the principle of path dependence, official policies in response to immigration are influenced by the structure of institutions constructed in past generations.

The settlement in continental European countries of the immigrants of the 1960s caused people to reflect upon their failure to foresee some of its consequences. Nowhere was this better expressed than in the often-quoted statement (in German) of a Swiss journalist: `We called for labour, but people came'.

As they recovered from the effects of World War II, the economies of Western Europe called for labour. France, West Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and other states, all admitted migrant workers, first from the `near abroad' (North Africa, East Germany, Finland and Ireland in the case of the states mentioned) and then from countries outside Europe. The imperial states (Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom) admitted entrants from their colonies, some of whom possessed citizenship in the metropolitan country. Germany entered into contracts with Turkey for the supply of migrant workers. To start with, there was little consideration of whether the migrants would later return or become settlers. For example, after the arrival of the *Empire Windrush* from Jamaica in 1948, the British Colonial Office opened a new file `West Indian migrant workers in England'. Very many proved to be, not migrant workers, but immigrants or settlers.

It is important to note that throughout Europe these migrants entered as replacement labour. They took the jobs that ethnic majority workers did not want, the `dirty' jobs, work on the night shift, the low-paid work. There was very little economic competition with the ethnic majority workforce.

By the process of `family reunification', and by the contracting of marriages with spouses from their countries of origin, distinctive immigrant communities became established. In the nineteen-eighties the entry of refugees and asylum-seekers increased. Some of those seeking asylum were economic migrants. Some had acquired professional qualifications. Others were unskilled, driven by a rate of population growth in many African and Asian countries that far exceeded their economies' demand for labour. Then European countries tightened their border controls.

Until the nineteen-eighties there was little talk of `ethnic groups' or `ethnic origin' in Europe, either among social scientists or in the general public. In the UK the talk was of `immigration' and of `race'; the two were closely associated. Elsewhere in Europe, it was simply `immigration'. The change in nomenclature

may have been captured in 1983 when Stockholm University established a Centre for Immigration Research (*Invandringsforskning*), but the Centre staff maintained that in English it was better named the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations.

The colonial dimension

A sample of members of the British public was asked in 1951, as part of a government survey, `Providing, of course, that there is plenty of work about, do you think that more coloured people should be encouraged to come and work over here?' In 1956 I repeated this question in a survey of my own, changing the wording to `Providing, of course, that there is plenty of work about, do you think that more coloured colonials should be allowed to go on coming to this country?' Polls in 1958 and in May 1961 asked whether immigration should be free or controlled. As can be seen from Table 1, public opinion changed. By 1968 support for free entry had dwindled to almost zero.

Table 1

Free Entry for Immigrant Workers from the Colonies

	1951	1956	1958	1961
Yes or yes I think so	38	37	21	21
Yes, providing there *is* work, etc.	8	35		
No/Immigration to be controlled	38	18	65	73
Other answers	10	9		
Don't know	6	1	14	6

In the early fifties the majority population believed that the possession of colonies was to the nation's benefit and that colonial people generally came to Britain either to study or as visitors. Then, round about 1958, at a time when the public learned that the colonies were becoming independent, they discovered that newcomers from the West Indies and South Asia were not visitors but settlers. I was not permitted to publish the 1951 figures until the file was archived. I then commented on the change in the late fifties, concluding that `As long as the Empire was run by people of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish ancestry, and of `white' appearance, ancestry, appearance and political power were equated: being British meant all three… One of the last consequences of Empire was the change in the composition of the British population and its internal relations… Because relations between whites and blacks are no longer relations between imperial and colonial people, the English, for the first time in a hundred years, have to ask what is to define their ethnicity.' (Banton 1983: 557)

Maybe there was a difference between countries that had colonies, like France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and visits from people who lived in them, and those countries that, like Germany after 1918, did not. The difference affected

the nature of immigrant settlement and the kinds of discussion about integration that followed.

Majority self and other-identification

My first passport in 1948 identified me as `British Subject by Birth'. In 1958 it was `British Subject: Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies'. By 1988 it had become `British Citizen', while since 1993 I have been a citizen of Europe. The switch from being a subject to being a citizen runs in parallel with other political and economic changes, including the institution of a citizenship ceremony. Anyone wanting to become a British Citizen now has to pass a test and either swear an oath or affirm `that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law.'

Another change is devolution. In the UK, the public accepts the claim of the Scots to be the *staatsvolk* in Scotland, and comparable claims of the Welsh nationalists and Irish republicans. Similarly, there are many English people who believe that England is `their' country, though they are not under the same pressure to make claims on this basis as the Scots, Welsh, and Irish. The incoherent sense of `English rights' comes out when they think that their government has conceded too much to foreigners and to immigrants. I will revert to this later in connection with differences of religion, for while members of the majority might cite the maxim `when in Rome, do as the Romans', and expect the immigrants to `assimilate', no one thought they ought to change their faith. That was a private matter.

As in other countries, the established population in the UK felt that though they had in some way to identify the incomers, they did not need to identify themselves. At first they called the incomers `colonials' or `immigrants'. Then some ordinary members of the public called them `ethnics'. There were references to `ethnic' police officers, as if white British police officers did not have ethnic origins. In the USA this was known as `minus one ethnicity', because any list of ethnic groups was assumed to be a list of newcomers; those already in place were not included. In Britain usage started to change in the 1980s with the introduction of `ethnic monitoring', and the inclusion of a question in the 1991 census asking everyone to identify by `ethnic group' (Banton 2001). As a result, there are figures such as those from the 2001 census:

	%White, British	%Mixed	%Asian or Asian British	%Black or Black British	%Chinese
London	59.5	3.5	13.1	10.1	1.8
Leeds	82.6	2.0	6.9	2.5	0.7

In the early 1970s I took part in a number of training courses for police officers. They were insistent that they did not need to be taught `community relations'. The immigrants had to learn and observe British law. Only after police conduct in connection with the `race riots' of 1972 was called into question, and detectives had difficulty investigating crimes (including murder) within minority

communities, did police attitudes alter. The 1972 London riots, the *fatwah* on Salman Rushdie in 1989, and the 2001 riots in Northern cities, inspired the current policy for the promotion of community cohesion. While wishing to minimize further immigration, public opinion accepts the need for such a policy.

Over the last half-century opinion polls have recorded a decline in the social distance members of the majority express towards members of the minorities. The degree of distance expressed varies with the degree of cultural distance and it is reflected in the significant increase in the number of children recorded as having more than one ethnic or national origin. They are sometimes referred to as `mixed race', though this is not a suitable name. I have argued (Banton 2011: 191) that `In contemporary European societies differences in skin colour are more often used to create a *colour scale* (in which individuals are ranked by socio-economic status with complexion as one of the constituent elements that is taken into account). Any indication that a person is of distinctive ethnic origin may similarly be used, along with other characteristics, to assess a person's status or suitability for some role.'

Minority self and other-identification

In the same article I recalled the disappointment of the first generation West Indian immigrants that the `mother country' proved so unwelcoming. In the late 1960s, responding to the civil rights movement in the USA, both the parental generation and their children defined themselves as Black. They maintained that practices of racial discrimination had to be addressed as a major challenge to the political order, and therefore stressed race as a political dimension. When, in the seventies, an educational philosophy of multiculturalism was advanced as an alternative to one of anti-racism, reference to ethnic difference became politically suspect in their eyes.

Many immigrants from the Indian subcontinent were already familiar with much of British culture, but there were variations. It was said that to most of the immigrants from Pakistan, Britain `was a foreign land whose language, customs and religion, and way of life were totally alien to them. Their loyalties were to their own new nation, to their region, to their village, and above all to their kin. They came to England asking nothing of their hosts except to settle for a little while, work, and earn for their families at home…' (Rose *et al* 1969: 440).

Afro-Caribbeans (or African-Caribbeans as some prefer to call themselves) took a leading role in the 1970s in trying to create a maximal constituency that would mobilise all non-whites as Blacks. This movement had very little success. South Asian settlers overwhelmingly self-identified as Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; these categories often divided internally along lines of caste. Much energy went into competitive temple and mosque–building. Minority members compare themselves with other minorities as well as with the majority.

In some minorities, particularly in the first generation, migrants send cash remittances to their kinsfolk in their communities of origin, but I know of

nothing in Britain to compare with the situation of Moroccans in France, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy. The government of Morocco established special institutions that at one time succeeded in encouraging migrants to remit between 80 and 90 per cent of their earnings for investment in the development of their homeland economy (Collyer, et al. 2009:1557). Presumably the self-identification of Moroccan workers in Europe was national rather than ethnic.

One setting in which national self and other-identification comes to the fore in Britain, as in other European countries, is in sport. A substantial number of British Asians support teams from their country of ancestry particularly when they are playing cricket against England. This forges a symbolic link with the subcontinent and provides an opportunity for them to distance themselves from those elements of Englishness with which they feel uncomfortable. In football it is otherwise. The England team ranks high in international football; the Indian, Pakistani and Sri Lankan teams do not. So young aspirant South Asian footballers in England are more likely to dream of a place in the England team than in an Asian one (Burdsey 2006: 17, 20-21).

This is more instructive than the notion of `symbolic ethnicity' seen as a stage in the acculturation of immigrants, with its implication of eventual cultural uniformity (Gans 1994). In the cricket example, nothing is learned from any attempt to distinguish identification on the basis of ethnic origin from identification on the basis of national origin. In the cases discussed by Gans, nothing is learned from any attempt to distinguish identification on the basis of ethnic origin from identification on the basis of religion. The critical question is whether the readiness of South Asians to identify with a team from the country of origin predicts how they will identify in other circumstances. The comparison with football suggests that it will have low predictive value.

Religious identification

As of August 2011, it is reported that the legislatures in France, Belgium and Italy have adopted, or begun a process of adopting, laws designed to restrict the use, by Muslim women, of the full-face veil or *niqab*. The Netherlands, has, I understand, introduced restrictions, while there have been court cases in Germany and the UK in which it has been decided that a woman wearing such a veil cannot fulfil her duties as a school teacher. In Switzerland there has been a referendum in which a majority voted for the withholding of planning permission for minarets as part of mosque buildings. It is far from certain that these restrictions are in accordance with the international legal obligations of European states.

I do not wish to discuss in this memorandum the rights and wrongs of such developments, but only to contend that they draw attention to the sociological dimension to majority emotions. It is important to consider this dimension because when, in the recent past, members of the majority public have complained about changes associated with immigration, their concerns have

been dismissed as evidence of a failure to keep up with the times, as `white backlash culture', or even as bigotry[1,2]. Throughout Europe, the democratic deficit has not been addressed. In Britain, the ECHR has been the object of ill-informed criticism. If pressed, sociologists would surely agree that the complexities of majority sentiment are not captured by the Eurobarometer or by similar polls. Despite the case for more imaginative analysis of popular sentiment, the terrain has been seen as a political minefield and social researchers have taken fright[3]. Since members of minorities also have preferences for association with co-ethnics, and also have at times to choose between an ethnic norm and a civic norm, this ought not to be too sensitive an issue.

I have contended that in all societies humans grow up to regard the customs followed by their kin and neighbours as the proper way to behave. Many of those customs are associated with particular social classes and there is variation from one individual to another, but the relevant consideration is that the familiar is generally treated as in some degree normative. If they grow up in a milieu in which everyone is of the same colour and speaks the same language, many will regard that colour and that language also as normative. Individuals will vary in their preferences for cultural uniformity, but some will experience a sense of loss when persons speaking other languages, wearing different costumes, and introducing what are seen as foreign institutions appear in their neighbourhoods in significant number. This may be a factor in the opposition to the full-face veil.

Not all moral obligations can be translated into legal obligations. In England, no one is under a general legal obligation to help the police, though many people feel that they are under a duty to help them. After the prosecution in 1979 (and subsequent conviction) of the editor of *Gay News* for blasphemous libel, and the *fatwah* on Salman Rushdie, there was much discussion of the principles involved. Similar issues surfaced in the controversy in 2005-2006 over the Danish publication of cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed. Did not everyone have a moral duty to avoid hurting the feelings of their fellow-citizens? Maybe, but there is no way in which such a duty can be given legal effect in the Anglo-American legal order (in France, it is different). Blasphemy has not been a criminal offence in the England since 2008, but very many people believe they should avoid saying or doing things that others might consider blasphemous.

Those who approach these issues from the standpoint of individual rights very properly stress the demands of ECHR Article 9 stating that `Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom… to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance'. This freedom is subject to limitations necessary `for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. If there is to be any discussion of how such rights are best balanced against the ethnic majority sentiment that incomers are under a duty to show respect for what they prize as their way of life, sociologists have a contribution to make. Variations in majority sentiment may help explain majority self and other-identification and, thereby, majority-minority relations.

A provisional conclusion

Though the countries of Europe vary in their historical experience of immigration there are continuities[4]. All nations have both an ethnic and a civic dimension. Because the relatively late establishment of a German state united previously existing polities that already shared a common culture and language, the ethnic dimension became strong in German self-conceptions and perceptions of others. *Staatsvolk* is, after all, a German expression. A person is a German if he or she was born in territory that was part of Germany in 1913.

Because of its commitment to republican doctrine, France is the quintessential civic state. Any notion of a *staatsvolk* would be a constitutional outrage and ethnic origin cannot be a legitimate basis for differentiation. It was for this reason that in 1980 the government notified the UN Secretary-General that article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (with its reference to `ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities') `is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned'. Yet Le Pen's *Front Nationale* gathers votes because it appeals to those who are seen as *français de souche*. An unrecognised *staatsvolk* hides in the shadow of the constitution.

There are two new elements. One is the growth of Europe-wide legislation designed to harmonise state practices[5]. The other is the welfare state. The findings discussed by Koopmans and Hansen, and summarised in the opening paragraphs of this memorandum, offer a basis for a provisional conclusion. Majority attitudes are strongly influenced by the welfare institutions established in European states before the era of immigration. Members of the *staatsvolk* see these institutions as their patrimony. This factor may be particularly strong in Denmark, though that is not one of the states analysed by Koopmans.

The welfare states provide services for refugees while their applications for asylum are considered, but, to be consistent with their institutional structure, they cannot normally allow them to take up employment before their status has been decided. This has unintended consequences.

Within their own community life, the members of neither majorities nor minorities see their fellows as co-ethnics. The ethnic vocabulary comes into use chiefly when minority members have to negotiate with members of the majority, especially when this relates to policies intended to promote equality irrespective of ethnic origin. What distinguishes the social circumstances in which people employ ethnic categorisation is a prime topic for future research.

Notes

1. A significant episode in the British general election of 2010 occurred in Rochdale. The Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was introduced to a life-long Labour supporter who voiced some complaints, including `You can't say anything about these immigrants. All these eastern Europeans what are coming in – where

are flocking from?' After he had returned to his car, Brown complained `You should never have put me with that woman… She was just a sort of bigoted woman'. He still had a microphone attached to his lapel and the recording company released the audio to the press. There was a media frenzy that seriously damaged the Labour cause (Rawnsley 2010: 730-732).

2. Majority sentiment varies from one locality to another. The borough of Tower Hamlets in the East End of London is distinctive for its twentieth-century tradition of community sentiment among whites and Jewish settlers, reinforced by the experience of wartime bombing. A survey of popular feelings there, carried out in the mid-1990s, reported that `One of the more revealing and human features of the findings lay in the complexity of people's feelings. Most white subjects, including some of the most explicitly hostile to Bangladeshis, admitted that while they resented the immigrants and what they felt their presence was doing to the area, they somehow managed to get on with them, or even to like them'… `By far the largest number of complaints arose in connection with Bangladeshi claims on the welfare state… there was also a widespread feeling that it was the system itself, rather than the players, that was mainly at fault… The evolution of the welfare state had turned it from a mutual-aid society writ large, as it seemed at first, into a complex, centralised and bureaucratic system run by middle-class do-gooders who gave generously to those who put nothing into the pot while making ordinary working people who *did* contribute feel like recipients of charity when drawing their own entitlements'… `conventional attempts to promote racial harmony by attacking `racism' may not be helping. For such efforts often involve a misrepresentation of what it is that working-class respondents are trying to say. When they try to express what they feel they are made to appear bitter, xenophobic, and out of touch with mainstream national opinion' (Dench, Gavron & Young 2006: 172, 177, 181, 208, 216-217).

3. Research could be undertaken into the preferences that persons, of both majority and minority origin, express for cultural uniformity relative to other things they consider important (for an example of such a study, see Banton 2000). If sets of persons expressing distinctive preferences are found, the next step would be to see if the variance is explicable in terms of religion, age, socio-economic status, etc., or if there is a separate ethnic variable.

4. In the 2003 European Social Survey subjects were asked: `Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. 1. be white. 2. come from a Christian background; 3. speak [one of] the official language[s] of the [country]; 4. be committed to the way of life in [country]; 5. have good educational qualifications; 6. have good work skills that [country] needs.' An analysis separated three categories of country. A: Countries drawing stronger than average racial and religious boundaries – Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland. Poland, Czech Republic, & Ireland. B: Countries drawing stronger than average linguistic and cultural boundaries – Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg & Slovenia. C: Countries drawing weaker boundaries – Switzerland, Norway, Denmark & Sweden. While there were many variables to

be considered, the author of the study (Bail 2008) concluded that the population in countries of category A drew these boundaries primarily because they had been countries of emigration and were now coming to terms with mass immigration. Those in category B had been getting used to immigrants over a longer time period. Those in category C were `accommodating isolationists'.

5. EC Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 allows asylum seekers to apply for permission to work if they have not received an initial decision on their asylum claim after 12 months.

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2011-09-08